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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuB PRocBss-CoERCED CoNFESSIONS 
AND THE STEIN CASE-Stein v. People of State of New York,1 a coerced 
confession case decided by the Supreme Court last June, at first suggests 
some rather startling propositions about the effect of a denial of pro-
cedural due process. Since Brown v. Mississippi2 in 1936 it has been 
well settled that the admission of a coerced confession into evidence in 
1346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953). 
2297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). 
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a state3 criminal proceeding contravenes the due process guaranty of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the confession cases subsequently 
considered by the Supreme Court it has been consistently held that the 
admission of an extorted confession vitiates the entire proceeding and 
renders the conviction void. 4 Moreover, the cases have indicated that 
where a coerced confession has been used in evidence the conviction 
must fall even though there is evidence apart from the confession suf-
ficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 5 Indeed, this is in accord with the 
general constitutional doctrine that a denial of procedural due process 
is jurisdictional in nature, resulting in a nugatory proceeding irrespec-
tive of the weight of evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused. 6 
However, the majority of the Court in the Stein case held that even 
though a coerced confession may7 have been admitted into evidence, 
the conviction would be sustained because there was other evidence 
sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty by the jury. The purpose of 
this comment is to examine the implications of this decision and to 
attempt to determine to what extent it overrules well-settled constitu-
tional principles. 8 
3 The Supreme Court has exacted an even higher standard than due process in exer-
cise of its general supervisory powers over federal courts. McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943). See also 50 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 772 (1952). While this 
comment will be confined to due process requirements in state criminal proceedings, these 
requirements apply a fortiori in the federal courts. 
4 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 
547, 62 S.Ct. 1139 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 
68 S.Ct. 302 (1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Turner v. 
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct. 1352 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 
69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949). 
5 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 at 597, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944); Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401 at 404, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 599, 
68 S.Ct. 302 (1948); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 at 63, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951); 
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 at 190, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). See 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
125 (1952). 
6Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Avery v. 
State of Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891 (1953). 
7 The Court decided the case in the alternative: (I) there was evidence to support a 
jury finding that the confessions were not coerced, and (2) if they were coerced, their 
submission did not make unconstitutional a conviction based on other evidence. Therefore, 
it is impossible to state whether the confessions were found to be coerced or voluntary. 
8 Several problems arising in the confession cases, such as what constitutes coercion 
for the purpose of due process and the scope of review by the Supreme Court, are outside 
the scope of this comment. See generally Bader, "Coerced Confessions and the Due Process 
Clause," 15 BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 51 (1948); lnbau, ''The Confession Dilemma in the United 
States Supreme Court," 43 ILL. L. R.Ev. 442 (1948); McCormick, "Some Problems and 
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 Tex. L. R.Ev. 239 (1946); Wicker, 
"Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions," 5 V AND. L. R.Ev. 507 (1952); 
comments, 50 MICH. L. R.Ev. 567 (1952); 50 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 1367 (1952); 28 N.C. L. 
R.Ev. 390 (1950). 
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I. The Dilemma in Instructing the Jury 
A. The Facts of the Stein Case.I' The defendants were tried for 
the crime of felony murder1° in New York. Confessions obtained from 
two of the defendants, Cooper and Stein, were submitted to the jury, 
along with other evidence, since the New York practice is to submit 
the issue of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury when the trial 
judge :finds that it presents a fair question of fact. The jury was in-
structed to consider the confessions as evidence of the guilt of the 
defendants only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
confessions were voluntary and free from coercion. The jury returned 
a general verdict of guilty. On review by certiorari in the Supreme 
Court the part played by the confessions and the :finding of the jury 
as to their voluntariness was uncertain and unascertainable, requiring 
the Court to consider the constitutional effect of either alternative, i.e., 
that the jury found the confessions v~luntary, or that the jury found 
them coerced and convicted the defendants on the basis of other evi-
dence. In either event, the Court held that the convictions were valid. 
Speaking for six members of the Court,11 Justice Jackson held that the 
jury might have found the confessions voluntary tested by due process 
standards,12 but that if it found the confessions coerced, acquittal was 
not required in view of other evidence sufficient to warrant conviction. 
B. The Role of the Jury. There are two principal views with 
respect to the role of the jury in determining the use of a confession 
as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The use of a confession raises 
somewhat different problems under these two views. 
I. The orthodox rule. Although followed by only a minority of 
states today,13 the orthodox rule is that the admissibility of a confession, 
9 One aspect of the case is not discussed-the problem of Wissner, a third defendant 
who did not confess but was implicated by the confessions of the other two defendants. 
The court held that no constitutional right of Wissner was violated. This case is popularly 
known as "The Reader's Digest Murder Case"; for a lighter treatment of the case prior to 
the Supreme Court decision, see OURSLER, THE REAI>Bn's ThGBST MtrnDBR CASB (1952). 
10 First degree murder because committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of a 
felony. N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney, 1944) §1044(2). 
11 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Burton, Clark, Minton and Reed joined in the 
majority opinion. Separate dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Black, Frankfurter, 
and Douglas. 
12 I.e., the confessions were not obtained by use of physical violence or psychological 
coercion, nor did illegal detention render them inadmissible. For general treatment of due 
process standards, see references in note 8 supra. 
13 According to 170 AL.R. 569 (1947) only twelve jurisdictions are definitely com-
mitted to this rule. The problem is complicated by the fact that in some states it is not 
clear what rule is followed. Wigmore indicates in his treatise that this is the majority rule, 
but his citations, particularly considering those in the supplement, do not support this 
statement. 3 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §861 (1940). See also note 18 infra. 
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like any other piece of evidence, is a question of law for the judge.14 
If the trial judge rules the confession admissible, the evidence adduced 
at the preliminary inquiry by the court relating to the circumstances 
under which the confession was given is sent to the jury, along with 
the confession, and the jury is instructed that it may determine the 
weight or credibility to be given to the confession,15 as in the case of 
any other evidence submitted to the jury. 
Under this view that the admissibility of a confession is determined 
solely by the court, it would seem that the failure to exclude the con-
fession would be so prejudical that a new trial would be required, if 
the ruling is found to be erroneous on appeal. The majority opinion 
in the Stein case indicates that where this is the practice the conviction 
would normally fall with the confession,16 but the important point to 
note is that double jeopardy concepts do not prevent the ordering of 
a new trial in this event.17 Hence, the Stein decision probably does 
not affect those states which follow the orthodox rule that the judge 
determines the admissibility of confessions. 
2. The prevailing practice. The prevailing rule in the United 
States today is that the trial judge makes only a preliminary determin-
ation on the admissibility of a confession, leaving to the jury the reso-
lution of the question of voluntariness, and hence ultimate admissi-
bility .18 As will be recalled from the statement of the facts in the 
Stein case, New York follows this practice. It is in jurisdictions fol-
lowing this view that the confession dilemma becomes acute. In the 
Stein case, the defendants requested an instruction to the jury that if 
it found the confessions to have been coerced it must return a verdict 
of acquittal. Under such an instruction, if the jury £.nds the confession 
submitted to it to have been extorted and returns a verdict of acquittal 
solely because of the use of the confession, the defendant would go 
free, for double jeopardy concepts would prevent a new trial. Ob-
viously, such a result would be intolerable and would be a grave mis-
carriage of justice. Yet this would seem to have been the required 
instruction in cases where there was a ~onfession and independent 
14 3 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §861 (1940). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Principal case at 191-192. 
11 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192 (1896). Cf. Brock v. North 
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 73 S.Ct. 349 (1953). 
18170 A.L.R. 569 (1947); 5 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 130 (1948); McCormick, "Some 
Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 TEx. L. REv. 239 at 
250-251 (1946). Wigmore terms this practice heresy. 3 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 
§861 (1940). For a good judicial discussion of the problem, see State v. Crank, 105 Utah 
332, 142 P. (2d) 178 (1943) (holding admissibility to be a question of law for the judge). 
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evidence which must be submitted to the jury for simultaneous de-
liberation, if the position of the dissenters had been adopted.19 The 
use of a special verdict or interrogatories, a possible alternative, has not 
been developed in American criminal procedure, 20 and there is some 
doubt as to its constitutionality.21 Other alternatives under a doctrine 
contrary to that of the Stein case would seem to demand either a return 
to the orthodox rule of requiring the judge to pass on the admissibility 
of confessions, or the use of only those confessions to which the accused 
fails to object.22 However, as a result of the Stein decision, jurisdic-
tions following the practice of submitting the confession to the jury 
when it presents an issue of fact as to voluntariness apparently may 
continue to do so by instructing the jury to disregard the confession 
if it finds the confession to have been involuntary. 
II. Effect of Evidence Apart from a Confession Sufficient to Convict 
It is quite clear from language in the cases prior to Stein that even 
though evidence apart from the confession might be sufficient to sustain 
the jury's verdict, if the evidence contains an involuntary confession 
the conviction cannot stand.23 Whether this was ever expressly held 
is doubtful,24 but it unquestionably accords with well-settled due pro-
19 Of course, if the Supreme Court had reversed in this case, it would not have pre-
vented retrial of these defendants. See note 17 supra. 
20 E.g., no provisions for special verdicts or the use of interrogatories may be found in 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also principal case at 178. 
21 The common law concept of jury trial in criminal cases embraced only a general 
verdict. A special verdict may well be held to be an impairment of jury trial. People v. 
Tessmer, 171 Mich. 522 at 529, 137 N.W. 214 (1912); State v. Boggs, 87 W.Va. 738 at 
749, 106 S.E. 47 (1921). However, it should be noted that the Federal Constitution 
imposes no requirement of jury trial on the states. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 
S.Ct. 448 (1900); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 13 S.Ct. 105 (1892). 
22 As a practical matter, it would seem that the accused would object if he has counsel 
where the circumstances of the acquisition of the confession provide a possible argument 
that the confession was coerced. 
23 See note 5 supra. 
24 Jn most of the cases where these statements were made they were dicta, in that the 
Court held that the confessions were not in fact coerced. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 
64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951); Stroble 
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 
S.Ct. 302 (1948), the only question decided was whether the confession was coerced, the 
Court finding that it was. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945), 
comes closest to holding that where evidence apart from a confession is sufficient to convict, 
and a coerced confession is admitted, due process is violated. However, only four members 
of the Court joined in the majority decision on this point. Four justices dissented. Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion turned the tide in favor of reversal, but his opinion was 
based on somewhat different grounds, i.e., that considering all the factors, Malinski was 
denied a fair trial. Id. at 417-418. 
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cess concepts.25 In view of the Stein case it becomes important to 
determine to what extent such language and settled doctrines are now 
overruled. 
A. Bases for Exclusion of a Coerced Confession. The traditional 
rationale for the exclusion of involuntary confessions, as a general rule 
of evidence, is that they are testimonially untrustworthy, lacking in 
probative value as evidence.26 This theory has been articulated by 
several members of the Supreme Court as the constitutional criterion 
for determining whether there has been a denial of due process.27 A 
second theory is that admission of a forced confession violates the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 28 However, the most widely ac-
cepted criterion for testing the constitutional validity of the use of a 
confession was stated by Justice Roberts in Lisenba 11. California: 
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude pre-
sumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in 
the use of evidence, whether true or false."29 Clearly this goes beyond 
the requirement of reliability, and in effect often amounts to an attempt 
to regulate police conduct in the acquisition of evidence.30 This con-
cept of due process has been decried by writers,31 and even disclaimed 
by the Court on occasion. 32 
It is not clear whether the denial of due process under this "funda-
mental unfairness" test results from the extraction of the confession or 
its admission into evidence. Illegality in the manner of obtaining 
evidence is not a valid basis for objecting to its admissibility under 
25 See note 6 supra. 
26 3 WIGMORB, EvroBNCE, 3d ed., §822 (1940). 
27 See Jackson, J., in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 59-60, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); 
Burton, J., in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 607, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948). 
28 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183 (1897). Justices Black and 
Douglas, consistent with their thesis expounded in dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947), would make the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth 
Amendment a part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment See dissenting 
opinions of Black and Douglas in the principal case. See also comment, 50 MICH. L. R:Ev. 
567 at 570 (1952), for a discussion of self-incrimination as a basis for excluding a coerced 
confession. 
20 314 U.S. 219 at 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). 
30 This third theory is termed "protection against illegality in procedure theory" in 
50 MicH. L. R:Ev. 567 at 571 (1952). See also Perlman, ''Due Process and the Admissi-
bility of Evidence," 64 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1304 at 1309 (1951); Allen, ''Due Process and 
State Criminal Procedure: Another Look," 48 N.W. Umv. L. REv. 16 at 20 (1953); 28 
N.C.L. R:Ev. 390 (1950); 52 CoL. L. R:Ev. 423 (1952); l BAYLOR L. R:Ev. 171 (1948); 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952). 
31 Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. R:Ev. 679 and 909 
(1944); 3 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §851 (1940); Bader, "Coerced Confessions and 
the Due Process Clause," 15 BnooKLYN L. REv. 51 (1948); Inbau, "The Confession 
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43 ILL. L. R:Ev. 442 (1948). 
32 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). 
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common law doctrines, 33 and in several unlawful search-and-seizure 
cases arising in state courts the Supreme Court has held the admission 
of such evidence consistent with due process, even though the acquisi-
tion of the evidence violated due process.34 This would seem con-
sonant with a trustworthiness theory as to the admissibility of evidence. 
However, Rochin v. California35 indicates that shocking conduct in the 
extraction of evidence, despite its veracity, may infringe due process. 
In the confession cases the controlling question in determining admis-
sibility according to due process criteria is usually whether the activities 
of the police in obtaining the confession amounted to coercion. It 
would seem impossible and highly artificial to attempt to divorce the 
extraction of a confession from its use, for the circumstances of its 
extraction determine its admissibility. In appealing a conviction, how-
ever, the gravamen of a defendant's petition for reversal is a denial of 
a fair trial, not a disregard of due process prior to his trial.36 Hence, 
in the final analysis, it is the admission of the confession which con-
stitutes the violation of due process. 
What is the effect of Stein on these theories? Language in the 
majority opinion indicates that the result rested in part on a trust-
worthiness theory; it was said that the Court would overturn a verdict 
which could be based on other sufficient evidence only if it construed 
the due process clause as requiring a rigid exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence, rather than as simply prohibiting conviction on inherently 
untrustworthy evidence37 Justice Douglas in his dissent criticized this 
language in the majority opinion, arguing that the trustworthiness test 
is a departure from the rationale of prior decisions.38 Whether in fact 
this decision indicates a return to the trustworthiness test may be 
doubted,39 as will appear more fully below. 
83 8 WxcMoRB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940). 
84 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 
U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951). 
85 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952). 
36Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 235, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). However, the 
defendant may have a civil cause of action against police officers, e.g., under the Federal 
Civil Rights statutes. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951). 
37 Principal case at 192. 
88 Principal case at 207. 
39 Justice Jackson has rather consistently espoused the trustworthiness criterion [except 
in Rochin v. Califoxnia, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952)], but he has not obtained 
much support from other members of the Court. See comment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1367 
at 1377 (1952); Jackson's opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 59-60, 69 S.Ct. 
1347 (1949). Perhaps Justice Burton also would apply the trustworthiness test; see Haley 
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 607, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948). 
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B. Corroborated Coerced Confessions. Most states require cor-
roboration in the form of evidence independent of a confession tending 
to establish the corpus delicti in any case where the state relies on a 
confession, on the theory that confessions are generally an unreliable 
class of evidence. 40 But suppose a state allows the use of a confession 
which is admittedly involuntary but which is independently established 
as true by other evidence?41 This is a situation somewhat akin to the 
facts in the Stein case except that the confession there had not yet been 
found coerced at the time it was submitted to the jury. Does the de-
cision in Stein now legalize such a practice? Apparently, this precise 
question has never been ruled on by the Supreme Court,42 but prior 
language of the Court clearly indicates that the use of a coerced con-
fession even though _ corroborated by independent evidence would 
amount to a denial of due process,43 and this has been understood to 
be the rule. 44 
It may be argued that if trustworthiness is the constitutional cri-
terion, then a coerced confession corroborated by other evidence should 
not be regarded as a denial of due process under the Stein decision, 
since the possibility of unreliability has been dispelled. However, it 
is. doubtful whether a majority of the Court would accept this argu-
ment. In the Rochin case, a unanimous Court held that evidence 
obtained as a result of stomach-pumping was iµadmissible, despite its 
unquestionable trustworthiness. Moreover, as pointed out above,45 
the opinion of Justice Jackson in the Stein case indicates that in those 
states where the court determines the admissibility of a confession, an 
erroneous admission of a confession found on appeal to have been 
coerced will result in reversal. This suggests that the Stein case does 
not stand for the proposition that due process permits a coerced con-
fession to be admitted when corroborated by other evidence, but rather 
40 McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confes-
sions," 24 TEx. L. REv. 239 at 245 (1946). 
41 Some states, including Texas, apparently permit this practice. See l BAYLOR L. 
REv. 171 (1948). 
~2 This is essentially the same problem discussed in note 24 supra. See also comment, 
50 MrcH. L. REv. 1367 at 1371 (1952). 
43Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 50, n. 2, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 at 173, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952), where it is said in dictum that coerced 
confessions "are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained 
in them may be independently established as true." Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 at 
190, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). 
· 44 ''The rule now makes inadmissible confessions which may be corroborated by inde-
pendent evidence." Perlman, "Due Process and the Admissibility of Confessions," 64 HARv. 
L. REv. 1304 at 1309 (1951); 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 171 at 177-178 (1948); 50 MrcH. L. 
REv. 1367 at 1371 (1952). 
45 See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
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that it lays down a much narrower rule, viz., that a confession may be 
submitted with independent evidence when under state practice the 
jury determines the ultimate admissibility of the confession. In short, 
it appears that Stein does not sanction the use of evidence apart from 
the confession for the purpose of corroborating the confession, but only 
as an independent basis for guilt in the event the jury finds the con-
fession submitted with the other evidence to have been coerced. 
"III. Conclusions 
Although unprecedented and initially somewhat startling, it is 
believed that the result of the Stein case· is consistent with established 
due process concepts, for all that was decided is that it is not a denial 
of due process to submit a confession, objected to as obtained by 
coercion, to a jury along with other evidence.46 The aim of due process 
is to give an accused a fair trial; it is difficult to see how submitting a 
confession to a jury along with other evidence denies a fair trial in a 
legal system which regards jury trial in a criminal case a valuable right 
of an accused. But if the case is regarded as a somewhat aberrant 
notion of a non-prejudicial infringement of procedural due process,47 
it seems reasonably clear that the doctrine will be carefully limited to 
the confession cases in those states which allow the jury to play a part 
in the determination of the admissibility of a confession. The most 
significant consequence of the decision is that it recognizes the legality 
of existing practices with respect to submitting confessions to juries in 
states such as New York. In the states where the ultimate determin-
ation on the admissibility of a confession is made by the trial judge, it 
would seem that the decision is of little consequence. The alarm 
voiced by the dissenters that the case overturns settled principles of 
constitutional law seems largely unjustified. In light of practical con-
siderations and the fact that due process safeguards are not appreciably 
diluted, Stein v. People of State of New York seems to be a sound 
decision. 
Marvin 0. Young, S.Ed. 
46 Justice Jackson makes this clear in the principal case at 193 where he says: " ••• 
we base our decision, not upon grounds that error has been harmless, but upon the ground 
that we find no constitutional error." 
47 It is interesting to note that in areas outside criminal procedure, an aggrieved party 
may have to show prejudicial denial of procedural due process. See, e.g., Market Street 
Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770 (1945); NLRB 
v. Ford Motor Co., (6th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905 (both cases involved a claim of 
denial of due process in an administrative proceeding). 
